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Vladimir Tismăneanu needs no introduction to the Romanian public: his name 
is unequivocally linked with the post-communist (re)birth of political science in 
this country. After many years of ideological submission, political science was es-
tablished as an academic discipline in post-communist Romania through the joint 
efforts of some émigré specialists and a few innovative local scholars. If from the 
latter category, the new generation of political scientists is intellectually indebted 
to professors such as Alexandru Duţu and Daniel Barbu, from the former, aside 
Ghiţă Ionescu, Vladimir Tismăneanu features prominently as a mentor of the 
post-1989 generation of students in the field. As a professor at the University of 
Maryland at College Park, he has had the opportunity and willingness to train 
quite a number of emerging scholars from his native country. 
If his reputation as one of the founders of political science in post-communist 
Romania is generally acknowledged, his contribution to the field of recent history 
is less taken into account. Together with Vlad Georgescu and Dinu C. Giurescu, 
Tismăneanu was among the Romanian-born authors who, having the chance to 
emigrate while communism was still in power, could thoroughly study the nature 
of communism in western libraries and archives, and freely write about it. Since up 
to 1989 such endeavors were reserved only to those who lived outside Romania, 
after the collapse of communism contributions by such émigré scholars have been 
instrumental in shaping knowledge on the ”Old Regime” among locally based 
scholars, as well as laypeople. Tismăneanu, in particular, – through his studies on 
Romanian communism published in international journals or via broadcastings by 
western radio agencies before 1989 and articles in the Romanian media afterwards – 
has made known to a large audience his critical analyses of communism Bucha-
rest-style for more than twenty years. At the time when his major work on the 
history of the Romanian Communist Party, Stalinism for All Seasons, was published, 
his main ideas had already become common knowledge1. Looking retrospectively 
to his oeuvre, this essay highlights Tismăneanu’s major contributions to the study 
of Romanian communism. 
Such reflection is occasioned not only by the above-mentioned volume, but 
also by the specific context of its publication. Since the ongoing process of Euro-
pean enlargement will gradually obscure the West-East divisions from a political 
perspective, it is the high time to evaluate the historical basis of the public memory 
                                                
1 Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian 
Communism, University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles & London, 2003, translated 
into Romanian by C. and D. Petrescu as Stalinism pentru eternitate. O istorie politică a comunismului 
românesc, Editura Polirom, Iaşi, 2005. 
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that will continue to divide the continent for some time. In this respect, it is em-
blematic that Vladimir Tismăneanu’s volume dedicated to the Romanian commu-
nism closes the prestigious series ”Societies and Culture in East-Central Europe”, 
edited by Irena Grudzinska Gross and Jan T. Gross with the University of Califor-
nia Press. With the enlargement, the rationale behind this series, which aimed at 
highlighting that, in spite of political adversities, the region behind the Iron Cur-
tain has always been part of Europe, is now disappearing. No other book could 
have been more appropriate to end a series opened by three volumes dedicated to 
the emergence of civil society in Poland, the country that lead the way out of com-
munism in 1989, than one dedicated to the last and the most resilient Stalinist 
regime in the region. 
Compared to Vladimir Tismăneanu, no other author has ever consecrated so 
much time, energy and intellectual efforts to explain how a tiny group of believers 
with practically no support within the country could not only gain control over the 
entire society, but also maintain power in spite of successive waves of change 
throughout the Soviet bloc. At the same time, his perspective on this topic is en-
riched due to his privileged position as insider: a part of the history of the Roma-
nian communism is also a part of his family history. Thus, his writings have a rare 
quality among academic studies: characters are not pale, bookish descriptions, but 
real human beings, in whom great ideals encounter petty ambitions. The main 
question that Tismăneanu has tried to answer over the years is why the Romanian 
communist elite never abandoned Stalinist dogmas, continuing to act according to 
them even after Moscow discarded such dogmas. Putting the concept of political 
culture in the center of his analysis, Tismăneanu defines three major features of Ro-
manian communism: (1) its weakness in relation to the Moscow center – the pariah 
syndrome – hence the desire to assert its independence; (2) the precarious ideologi-
cal background of the most prominent party members, from here their dogmatism, 
and rejection of revisionism; and, last but by no means least, (3) the monolithic 
character of the political elite, forged in a ruthless struggle for power between 
three factions, which dominated the party life until the late 1950s. 
Tismăneanu’s theory of the three centers, in particular, is of crucial importance 
in understanding the nature of these confrontations within the Romanian Commu-
nist Party1. A common place in the history of the Romanian Communist Party 
(RCP) was the idea that, after the seizure of power, two factions confronted each 
other on ideological grounds. A Muscovite group that had spent the war years in 
the Soviet Union and comprised many ”alien” elements – including prominent 
militants such as Ana Pauker (of Jewish origin) and Vasile Luca (of Hungarian ori-
gin) – confronted a local one that had been imprisoned during the war and com-
prised mainly communists of Romanian ethnic origin. The first would have sup-
ported, not surprisingly, Stalin’s interests, whereas the second, which incidentally 
was the winning team, represented above all the national interests, and allegedly 
opposed to the Stalinization of the country. 
Few remember that this view, which became in the meantime common knowl-
edge, was initially promoted by no other than the leader of the prison faction, 
                                                
1 Tismăneanu first proposed the idea of the three centers within the RCP in his article 
”The Tragicomedy of Romanian Communism”, in East European Politics and Societies, vol. 3, no. 2, 
Spring 1989, pp. 329-376. See esp. note 46, pp. 349-350. See also Ferenc FEHÉR, Andrew ARATO 
(eds.), Crisis and Reform in Eastern Europe, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1991, pp. 121-174. 
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Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, during the Plenum of November-December 1961, at a 
time when the power struggle was already over and his supremacy within the 
party secured. During the following years, the Romanian leader indeed seized the 
opportunity to assert his party’s independence from Moscow, a political turn that 
seem to support his claims of embodying a national and, at the same time, anti-Sta-
linist line. In a slightly different version, his interpretation survived under his suc-
cessor, Nicolae Ceauşescu, who, although obscured Gheorghiu-Dej’s role, perpe-
trated this version of party’s history in order to asserting himself as the supreme 
leader who accomplished full independence from Moscow for the benefit of his 
country. This perspective continues to survive even after the fall of communism 
due to the memoirs of, and the oral history interviews with, the former nomenkla-
tura members. Obviously, beyond their unrealistic, fairy-tale like style, shaped by a 
conflict between good and evil, such interpretations fail to explain the key ques-
tion: why the Romanian communist regime, while asserting its right to follow a na-
tional path to communism, remained Stalinist in essence up to its very end. 
In opposition to such a view, Tismăneanu argues that during the war there 
were not two, but three factions within the party – one in the Soviet Union, one in 
the prisons, and one in the underground1. In this way, he stresses that the rivalry 
among them represented a brutal struggle for power, which had nothing to do 
with any alleged polemics over ideas. Initially, the first two centers united to de-
stroy the third and, in a second phase, the members of Muscovite faction and their 
allies were purged by the most coherent of all factions, which comprised those 
party members who socialized themselves together in the adverse environment of 
the prisons. This was not, therefore, a struggle in which Stalinists were defeated by 
anti-Stalinists, would-be supporters of the national interests, but a conflict in which 
neither ideology nor even ethnicity played any role. A monolithic – though fright-
ened and insecure – elite, incapable of questioning the views of the supreme 
leader, Gheorghiu-Dej, emerged from this savage power struggle. 
The theory of the three centers explains why splits within the RCP were 
avoided at all costs but, taken alone, does not explain why the Romanian commu-
nist leadership never ventured on a reformist path. In this respect, Tismăneanu 
demonstrates that it was the weak ideological training of the Romanian leading 
communists that hampered the emergence of genuine debates over the validity of 
Marxist-Leninist dogmas in party circles as well as in intellectual milieus2. None of 
the Stalinist leaders across the entire Soviet bloc was a great Marxist theorist; the 
vulgarization of Leninist teachings by Stalin himself was the only basis of their 
education. However, Krushchev’s de-Stalinization allowed critical Marxist think-
ing be heard and adopted by reform-minded factions of the communist parties. In 
the Central European countries, circles of intellectual debates preceded and even 
generated the turmoil of 1956 in Hungary and Poland, or the 1968 Prague Spring. 
The very existence of such debates depended on the presence of intellectuals with 
                                                
1 In this respect, see also the polemics between Tismăneanu and Pavel Câmpeanu. Câmpeanu 
has argued that there were only two centres that really counted: the group in prisons and that 
from Moscow, while the third, the underground group, was in fact subordinated to the former. 
See Pavel CÂMPEANU, ”Note asupra PCR în anii ‘40-’50”, in Sfera Politicii, nr. 2, 1993, pp. 18-19, 
and Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, ”Chestiuni de metodă”, in Sfera Politicii, nr. 3, 1993, p. 29. 
2 This argument is best developed in his ”From Arrogance to Irrelevance: Avatars of 
Marxism in Romania”, in Ray TARAS, (ed.), The Road to Disillusion: From Critical Marxism to 
Postcommunism in Eastern Europe, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk N.Y., 1992, pp. 135-150.  
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genuine knowledge of Marxism in official positions, which not only granted them 
access to a wider public through media, but also conferred their voice authority 
over party apparatciks. 
In Romania, persons with Marxist training, capable of pursuing an intellectual 
exercise of critical evaluation of these teachings, were either marginal or were mar-
ginalized by skilful maneuvers in order to avoid their gaining of influence. With 
the help of Leonte Răutu, a versatile personality in charge with the ideological ap-
paratus, Gheorghiu-Dej was able to eliminate after 1956 all the possible initiators of 
a revisionist nucleus from party-affiliated intellectual circles. With the help of 
Nicolae Ceauşescu, he managed in 1957 to purge the party leadership of those who 
tried to seize the opportunity opened by Khrushchev’s ”Secret Speech” to trigger 
debates over the role of Gheorghiu-Dej in the Stalinization of the country, i.e., 
Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chişinevschi. Such scheming opened the way to an 
even greater manipulation. As mentioned above, in 1961, after Khrushchev 
re-launched de-Stalinization, Gheorghiu-Dej, could present himself as the pro-
moter of the Romanian de-Stalinization which, according to him, took place in Ro-
mania even before Stalin’s death. 
However, Tismăneanu convincingly shows that the Soviet-inspired model of 
organizing the society was never abandoned by Gheorghiu-Dej or by his successor. 
All the steps undertaken by Romania to assert its independence from Moscow – 
such as the diplomatic efforts meant to convince Khrushchev to withdraw the So-
viet troops from Romania, the reluctance to cooperate within the COMECON, and 
the affirmation of RCP’s autonomy from the Soviet Union in the ”Declaration of 
April 1964” – must be seen from a new perspective. The manifest will of both lead-
ers, Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceauşescu, to proclaim their independence within the bloc 
comes from the inferiority complex Romanian communists developed in their 
early relations with Moscow. The RCP was from its beginnings a peripheral, 
Cominform-dominated political sect which came to power in the aftermath of 
WWII only due to the support provided by the Red Army. Obsessed with its lack 
of legitimacy, the Romanian communist elite sought to achieve the support of the 
local population by mimicking independence from Moscow. Moreover, by acting 
in dissonance with the Soviet Union in the international arena, they were taking re-
venge for decades of dependency on the ”Moscow center”. By asserting RCP’s in-
dependence, Gheorghiu-Dej opened the way for governing Romania undisturbed 
by evolutions in Moscow. This, however, did not imply a departure from the Sta-
linist model in domestic policy. In short, it was the ”pariah syndrome” of a politi-
cal culture obsessed with its own questionable heredity, argues Tismăneanu, that 
explains the unique mixture between the revolutionary external policy and the 
stagnation in internal affairs. 
Although Gheorghiu-Dej apparently wanted to direct his country towards 
Yugoslavization, while Ceauşescu turned it to Albanization, there was perfect conti-
nuity between the two Romanian communist dictators, whose thoughts and actions 
were shaped by this inferiority complex in relations with Moscow. In this respect, 
Tismăneanu emphasizes that the latter, as a member of the prison faction, had so-
cialized together with the former for many years until 1944. He had grown politi-
cally in the shadow of his mentor in the aftermath of the power struggle of 1952, ris-
ing to prominence after 1955, when appointed member of the Politburo responsible 
with the party apparatus. This position allowed him to gain an unparalleled influ-
ence among the cadres and ease his path towards succession. Stressing the political 
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continuity between the two leaders, Tismăneanu defines a spectacular gesture as 
Ceauşescu’s condemnation of the Soviet-led Warsaw Treaty Organization invasion 
of Czechoslovakia in 1968 – invoked by many in order to support alleged achieve-
ments made under communism – as an expression of ”anti-Soviet Stalinism”. 
The preservation of the values increasingly put under question in other 
communist countries by the proponents of the ”socialism with a human face” 
definitely transformed Romania into an exceptional case in the Soviet bloc. It 
was the lack of reforms combined with corruption and stagnation – in short, of 
anti-Khrushchevism with Brezhnevism – that characterized Ceauşescu’s dictator-
ship. Moreover, the concentration of power in the hands of Romania’s last commu-
nist tyrant was not matched but by Stalin’s own dictatorship after 1929. In order to 
define the peculiarities of Ceauşescu’s rule, Tismăneanu has coined the concept of 
”dynastic communism”1. In his view, this was not simple nepotism, i.e., simple 
promotion of relatives in key positions, but an unprecedented concentration of 
power in the hands of a single family combined with a flamboyant cult of person-
ality that encompassed, besides the dictator himself, members of the kin next to 
him, in particular his wife and son. In fact, as the concept suggests, under this form 
of communism, a dynastic scenario was envisaged by the supreme leader, worried 
that his blueprints for Romania – the building of ”socialism” at any costs – would 
not be continued otherwise. 
Besides the preservation of the values that were questioned in other countries 
by such leaders as Imre Nagy, Alexander Dubček or Mikhail Gorbachev, it was the 
extensive use of nationalist symbols and rhetoric that constituted a fundamental 
pillar of Ceauşescuism. What began in 1968 as a courageous gesture against the So-
viets, acclaimed at the time by the entire world, it developed into a very strange 
melange of Stalinism with nationalism. However, Ceauşescuism should not be un-
derstood just as an extreme variant of communist dictatorship, irrelevant for the 
evolution of the other Soviet-style regimes, but as an exacerbation of certain ele-
ments of the Stalinist political culture in the particular Romanian context. Thus, 
Tismăneanu has coined the concept of ”national Stalinism” which captures best, in 
his opinion, the essence of Romanian communism2. This term is appropriate be-
cause it avoids a possible mistake between the sense given to national communism 
in the literature on post-Stalinist Eastern Europe – designating the various paths of 
building socialism on which Soviet satellites embarked after 1953, and the sense 
given in the works dedicated to Ceauşescu’s dictatorship – referring to the use of 
nationalism by a communist regime. 
Tismăneanu’s national Stalinism is defined in opposition to national commu-
nism as understood in the first case. Common to both national communism and na-
tional Stalinism is the revolt against the hegemony of Moscow, supported by lead-
ers such as Imre Nagy, Alexander Dubček and Josip Broz Tito in the East, or 
Palmiro Togliatti and Santiago Carrillo in the West. Otherwise, where national com-
munism is innovative, national Stalinism is dogmatic. While the former encourages 
reforms and intellectual creativity, the latter goes against structural changes or criti-
cal thinking. In short, national communism represents an alternative to the Stalinist 
                                                
1 This concept was elaborated in his ”Ceauşescu’s Socialism”, in Problems of Communism, 
vol. XXXIV, January-February 1985, pp. 50-66, and ”Byzantine Rites, Stalinist Follies: The 
Twilight of Dynastic Socialism in Romania”, in ORBIS, Spring 1986, pp. 65-90. 
2 See his Stalinism for All Seasons, cit., pp. 18-36. 
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model implemented all across Eastern Europe after the Second World War, while 
national Stalinism is nothing else but the Stalinist blueprint in disguise. 
To conclude, the very evolution of the RCP, especially during the 1980s, illus-
trates that it was the most dogmatic party in the region, which never revisited its 
ideological views in order to cope with the internal crisis or to confront the new in-
ternational situation opened by Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempts at reforming the 
system. The manifest autonomy from the Soviet Union helped the Romanian com-
munists not only to gain some popular support in the 1960s, but also, in the late 
1980s, to present the reformist impulses given by Gorbachev from Moscow as be-
ing directed against the national interests. In fact, despite their weak ideological 
base, the Romanian communists understood very well one single principle, which 
represented the very essence of Stalinism: any attempt to reform this model of or-
ganizing society would result, sooner or latter, in its collapse. The Revolutions of 
1989 proved the validity of the Romanian communists’ guiding principle, but this, 
however, did not help them to stay in power much longer than their colleagues in 
the other satellite countries. Nevertheless, second and third rank members of this 
party, having understood that time could not be stopped any longer, used the op-
portunity opened by the popular revolt to overthrown the last Stalinist regime in 
Europe, assuring for themselves a better place in the post-communist political and 
economic elite. In fact, Tismăneanu argues, the ”Romanian exceptionalism”1 con-
sists in the fact that communism outlived the Romanian Communist Party. 
 
                                                
1 See also his ”Romanian Exceptionalism? Democracy, Ethnocracy and Uncertain Pluralism in 
Post-Ceauşescu Romania” in Karen DAWISHA, Bruce PARROTT (eds.), Politics, Power and Struggle 
for Democracy in South-East Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 403-451. 
